Syahrir the real / genuine diplomat.
by Prof. Dr. R.Z. Leirissa

((Insert full name or title))  Syahrir was the primary Indonesian representative during the negotiations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands regarding which side should have sovereignty over Indonesia. On November 14, 1945, the Indonesian National Central Committee, which from that time on functioned as parliament, appointed Syahrir as prime minister. As the Netherlands emphatically refused to negotiate withpresident Soekarno, the position of prime minister, which was in violation of the 1945 constitution, was intentionally created in order to enable the negotiations to take place between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands.  

For two years, Syahrir held the position of prime minister (November 1945 - June 1947). With full support from president Soekarno and vice president Hatta. Syahrir negotiated with the Netherlands with the aim of Indonesians obtaining sovereignty over their homeland. His Indonesian political opponents, consisting of political parties united in the "United Struggle," was led by Tan Malaka who refused negotiations with the Dutch, but instead preferred war.

Sutan Syahrir's Dutch negotiation counterpart was Dr. H.J. van Mook, Lieutenant Governor General of the Netherlands Indies from October 1945 untill November 1948. During these negotiations, particularly in the secret talks in March 1946, both parties offered the basic principles to solve the Republic of Indonesia - Netherlands conflict. Later their principles became known as the "Batavia Concept". One of the significant stipulations in this concept was for the Indonesian government structure to be changed from “Colonial State Netherlands Indies” to “Indonesian Federal State”. Though Syahrir, and later van Mook, had to leave their respective positions, the "Batavia Concept" remained. Eventually this concept became reality at the end of 1949 as a result of the Round Table Conference (RTC).

Why did Syahrir prefer diplomacy above war as the means to solve the conflict? We can study Syahrir's political thought-process in his article, "Our Struggle", published in November 1945. The first reason was his belief in the social democratic ideology, which rejected war, and to which he felt attached ever since he had been a student in the Netherlands. That was the reason why, during the Japanese occupation, he refused to cooperate with the Japanese army, and instead set up an “underground” organization. In these circumstances it can be assumed that he already had heard about the "Atlantic Charter" published by the Allies in August 1941. Among other suggestions, the charter proposed that in the post-war period, the world political order would undergo total change. First of all, colonial rule would cease to exist, as abolishment of colonialism was inevitable. Through the establishment of an international organization, world peace and human rights would be pursued. As the Allied post-war proposals were developed throughout the war, Syahrir followed these developments simply by clandestinely listening to foreign radio programs, which he did throughout the war.

With this background, Syahrir became convinced that sooner or later the Dutch would be forced to abandon Indonesia. That was one of the reasons he was certain the diplomacy of "using peaceful means to achieve peace" had a greater chance of success than waging war. His idea of achieving sovereignty by peaceful means constituted a praiseworthy moral approach.

Syahrir’s approach was turned into reality in November 1946 through the "Linggajati Agreement" which was the result of negotiations between a Dutch government delegation led by Prof. Dr. Ir. Schermerhorn. The Linggajati Agreement showed Syahrir's determination in his defense of Indonesian independence and sovereignty.  In the proposed agreement concept tabled by the Dutch, Article 2 stated, "The Indonesian Federal State is an independent state". Syahrir rejected this sentence and demanded it be changed to "The Indonesian Federal State is a sovereign state". During the meeting between the Dutch delegation and Soekarno - Hatta in Kuningan on 13 November 1946, the Dutch were compelled to accept Syahrir's demand, which moved President Soekarno to announce his full acceptance of the agreement.

In conclusion, it can be said that Syahrir's conviction that conflict be solved by peaceful means is still relevant today. Judging from the great support Syahrir's diplomacy received, his agreement regarding federalism might have only been a strategic tactic. However, to determine whether Syahrir regarded federalism as temporary tactic or as the ultimate goal of the struggle, further research is needed.